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ABSTRACT
One of the phenomena that accompanied the advance of the French Revolution
and its armies throughout the European Continent in the 1790s was the flight of
capital. Merchants and guild artisans, as well as aristocrats, had to turn to
merchant bankers and use the existing international capital markets to remove
the liquid part of their property beyond the reach of Revolutionary arms. There
is good reason to believe that they were successful to a much greater degree than
previously suspected, largely because the international capital markets of the
time were larger and better organized than previously thought. Moreover, these
capital movements from the Continent to Britain explain succinctly why the
British Industrial Revolution took place dxiring this period despite the large
pressures of war expenditiu-es and British government subsidies to Continental
allies taking place at the same time. The repatriation of capital to the Continent
from England after peace also helps explain the depression of British industry
and incomes from 1815 through the financial crisis of 1825, although the role of
British speculators was important too.

One of the phenomena that accompanied the advance of the French Revolution and its
armies throughout the European Continent in the 1790s was the flight of capital. The
revolutionaries abolished traditional property rights including feudal obligations and seigneurial
dues and they disrupted customary channels of trade. They brought with them the forced
circulation of the assignat within subjugated territories and forced loans from allied
revolutionary governments for the support of French armies elsewhere. (Schama, pp. 111-112)
Wealthy merchant capitalists, having strong financial ties already with England or other trade
centers beyond the reach of French arms, were able to transfer their moveable wealth nearly
intact. Most merchant bankers were able to avoid the capital losses implied by the revolution
and perhaps many were able eventually to profit from the new opportunities provided by war
finance. Other merchants were less favorably placed and did less well. Certainly the nobility
were desperate to liquidate and salvage what they could of their estates as well as to save their
lives. The emigres had to tvim to the international merchant bankers of the time and use the
existing international capital markets to remove the liquid part of their property beyond the
reach of Revolutionary arms.
There is good reason to believe that they were successful to a much greater degree than
previously sxispected, largely because the international capital markets of the time were larger
and better organized than previously thought. Moreover, these capital movements from the
Continent to Britain explain succinctly why the British Industrial Revolution took place during
this period despite the large pressures of war expenditures and British government subsidies to
Continental allies taking place at the same time. The return of emigre capital to the Continent
from England after peace also helps explain the depression of British industry and incomes from
1815 through the financial crisis of 1825, although the role of British speculators was important
too.
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This thesis is by no means new -- evidence was noted on the significance of capital
movements by the Bullion Committee in 1811 even though it was ignored in their final report.^
But it has been ignored increasingly as history and economic history have become more and more
nationalistic in interest and focus. 2 The size of anticipated capital flows out of Great Britain
played a key role in the restriction by the Bank of England of the gold convertibility of its notes
in 1797.3 Yhe large and sudden movements of foreign capital out of the British government
funds in 1817 were the major concern of the Bank oflEicials who wished to delay resxmiption of full
convertibility in 1819."* These early concerns about the potentially disruptive role of
international capital movements deserve to be taken more seriously than they have been
traditionally by economic historians. As we become more impressed in the 1980s by the
transmission of international financial disturbances in increasingly well-integrated capital
markets, it is clearly time to review and reassess the importance international capital
movements might have had in the past.
There are two, parallel, stories that need to be told here. One deals with the financial
markets and the circumstantial evidence that their operations produce about the possible
influence of foreign capital movements. The other deals with the physical indicators of Lndtistrial
output and structioral change that occurred during the war and the ten years following. Both
have been told in the past but the links between the two have not been examined closely. When
they are, we find that capital flight from the Continent, induced by the French Revolution and
Napoleonic finance, played an important, if largely concealed, role in the transformation of the
British economy we now call the Industrial Revolution. Consequently, the third story, which we
may call "A Tale of Two Revolutions", has not yet been told. But it is one that shoiild be told,
not only because it may explain in more compelling terms the logic of the historic transition fi-om
the Commercial Revolution to the Industrial Revolution, but also because it is a story still
unfolding through the continued evolution of international capital markets. The narrative,
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however, reqiiires preliminary analysis of the financial instrument used in the eighteenth
century for the international transfer of capital - the foreign bill of exchange.
The Financial Tale:
The Foreign Bill of Exchange and The Transfer Problem
The foreign biU of exchange took advantage of offsetting balances merchants
accumulated with each other in different ports so that local currency coxild be used only for local
payments while bills drawn against balances held abroad would be used for foreign payments.
The buyer of a bill (drawee, or remitter) purchased it from the drawer, a merchant with foreign
correspondents, paying in local currency (see Fig. 1, London side). He could then remit it to pay
for imports he had received from abroad. So the bill was drawn in foreign currency to be paid out
by the accepter of the biU in the foreign city to the final possessor of the bill (the payer and payee
on the Amsterdam side. Fig. 1), who either was the foreign exporter or the exporter's assignee.
There were typically four parties to the bill, shown in Fig. 1 as the drawer and drawee on the
London side, and the payer and payee on the Amsterdam side, although the eighteenth century
usage was to refer to the drawee as the remitter of the bUl, the payee as the possessor of the biU,
and the payer as the accepter.^ The payee in Amsterdam could assign the bill to another party,
but in so doing assvmied responsibility for its eventual payment along with the drawer and
accepter. Multiple assignments or endorsements therefore increased the security of this
negotiable instrument and its liqviidity.The ability of the London importer to pay the Amsterdam
exporter in a biU of exchange depended, of course, on the willingness of the Amsterdam merchant
banker who had to accept the bill to extend credit to the London merchant banker. This wovild be
influenced -both by the volume of trade biUs on Amsterdam accumulating in London relative to
the trade biUs on London arising in Amsterdam (i.e., by the balance of trade that was being
financed by biUs of exchange), and by the net demand in Amsterdam for British debt issues.^
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The essential feature of the bill of exchange is that its existence allowed payment for the
goods imported to occur by an export of short-term capital from Amsterdam to London in place of
a shipment of bullion in payment.
This financial innovation permitted the enormous expansion of European foreign trade --
both within Etirope and with Asia, Africa, and the Americas -- that constituted the Commercial
Revolution. (Price, 1989) It was also ;ised by European states, particularly Great Britain, for
non-commercial purposes. The British success in fighting European ware had begun with the aid
of William Hi's Dutch financiers in the War of the Grand Alliance (1688-97), and continued
through the Seven Years War (1756-63). (Dickson (1967), Neal (1977)) Fig. 2 shows how the
network of trade credit created by the widespread use of the foreign bill of exchange was
exploited by the British government to fijiance its armies on the European continent during the
eighteenth century. Bills of exchange were bought up by the Exchequer from London merchants
on their correspondents abroad and used locally to hire troops and purchase their supplies. Since
British maniifactured goods and colonial re-exports were in high demand in Europe, the bills
drawn in London were extinguished by the European merchants ordering imports from Britain.
British woolens were thus transformed into Hessian mercenaries fighting the French, at least
when the British war effort was successful.^ This sequence describes well the initial stages of the
finance techniques employed by Britain in the war against revolutionary France, 1793-1802,
with the major difference that Britain's continental allies were continually losing. As they lost
.battles against the French armies, so British merchants lost markets for their exports, and the .
bills of exchange drawn on London had to be extinguished increasingly by means of specie.
Pitt began his First Coalition against the French by hiring mercenaries from Hessia and
subsidizing troops fix)m Prussia, calcvdating his svuns in terms of a fijxed number of pounds
sterling per soldier provided.^ British exports and re-exports rose, as seen in Table 1 (cols. 2 and
3, constant prices). The loss of HoUand at the end of 1794 made this traditional form of
conducting war on the Continent impracticable and the conclusion of a separate peace by Austria
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in which the French were ceded Belgium in exchange for Austria's annexation of Venice brought
it to a humiliating close for the First Coalition. (It was resumed, however, dioring the Second,
Third, and Fifth Coalitions, using Hamburg as the entrepot rather than Amsterdam.) The
continued defeats of British allies and mercenaries meant losses of markets for British goods as
well as military losses. The loss of markets shows up in Table 1 as a slackened rate of exports
xintil the Treaty of Amiens in 1802. This provided a breathing spell for Britain and her
sometime allies and the volume of trade increased sharply between Britain and the Continent.
But the peace treaty also allowed Napoleon to consolidate his political power.
The fresh outbreak of war in 1803 brought new subsidies from Britain to the Continent,
the real transfer of which relied on increasing trade with Hamburg. This, however, was brought
to an ignominious halt by the Continental Blockade, as Napoleon sought by conscious policy to
undermine British financing of the Third Coalition in much the way the First Coalition had been
undone.^ In terms of Fig. 2, Napoleon sought to undermine the acceptance on the Continent of
bills of exchange drawn on London by making it very difficult to import British goods to the
Continent. He could think of no other reason why merchant bankers on the Continent would be
willing to accept London bills. Napoleon made his Blockade effective by occupying Hamburg in
November 1806. The British subsidies to the Continent virtually ceased. ^° The pound
weakened relative to the franc, the Dutch guilder, and the Hamburg pound Flemish, although
the dramatic fall did not occur until 1808. (See Fig. 5 where the fall in 1808 is preceded by a
short appreciation in the poimd sterling, a sign of a Uqmdity scramble in London.) All this is
evidence that the intended effects of the Blockade upon British trade were occurring.
Contemporary observers recognized this as well. In his testimony to the Bullion Committee in
1810, J. L. Greffuihe argued that the interruption of trade with the Continent had caused the
exchanges to fall, not an overissue of notes by the Bank of England. ^^
If the Continental Blockade worked as intended to hamper British exports to the
Continent, it did not succeed in halting Britain's financial support of Allied armies against
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Napoleon. The eventual failxire of Napoleon's economic attack on the financial structxire of
Britain is evident from the continued strength of the government stocks on the London Stock
Exchange (Fig. 5). The causes of this failure have been attributed to Britain's renewed overseas
trade in 1809 (mainly to new markets in Spanish America) and to alternative routes to European
markets through the Baltic and the Mediterranean (1813). (Heckscher)
In an intervention made in the Bullion Report debate, J. C. Herries, the Commissary
General in charge of supplying Wellington's Peninsular Army, suggested another reason the
Continental Blockade failed in achieving its ultimate intent:
Although it is by no means an ordinary case, it is certainly a possible one, that a
nation may expend abroad much more than it can immediately repay by the
export of Bullion, or of any other commodities. It may, on the credit of its
(jovemment, raise money in other countries, [my emphasis] to a larger amount, by
Bills of Exchange, than the purchasers of those Bills can immediately prociore
returns for. If the foreign markets are glutted with the produce of the borrowing
nation, and Bullion is very scarce and dear in its market (as in such a state of
things it would probably be), the foreign purchaser of its bills must expect
considerable delay and inconvenience, in bringing back his funds to his own
country: still, however, he might advance the money at a corresponding rate of
exchange. This is, probably, the case, with respect to our drafts from abroad at
this time: -- we are borrowing money to carry on our foreign expenditure, at a
high rate of interest. It is, however, an advantage, in some degree compensating
this extraordinary expence, that the debt, so created, must, ultimately, be
discharged in British produce or merchandize; and it is, therefore, so much foreign
capital invested in British industry [my emphasis]. (Herries, pp. 44-45)
In other words, the book credit built up by the Amsterdam merchant banker depicted in
Fig. 1 was seen by Herries to be a form of direct investment in Britain^^ because the only way he
could see for the debts of London bankers to be discharged eventually was by the export of
British goods. This is a very clever, if self-serving, argument, but it has the merit of being
testable against the movement of the exchange rates of the pound against the various currencies
on the Continent. The exchange rates were clearly recognized by the merchants and bankers of
the time to be determined by fluctuations in Britain's balance of payments. The balance of
payments, in turn, were determined both by the balance of trade and the movements of capital. ^^
Herries attributed the failure of the Continental Blockade to the willingness of Continental
merchant bankers to build up their short-term credits on London, anticipating eventual victory
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by Britain and its Allies, or at least a re-opening of trade routes, and a resiimption of British
exports. The ultimate failure of the Continental System, of course, lay in the eventual military
defeat of France, but this was due less to British trade reboimding than to strictly military
factors, especially Napoleon's disastrous 1812 campaign in Russia. This is rather a long time to
sustain short-term trade credits.
Rather than the rise of illicit trade, or the increase in short-term trade credit given to
Britain, then, it seems more reasonable to attribute the Blockade's failure in financial terms to
offsetting capital movements - investment by Continental merchants and aristocrats in the
British funds. To the extent that Napoleon succeeded in his objective of changing Britain's trade
surpliis with the Continent to a trade deficit, he was succeeding also in reversing capital flows.
Moreover, by raising the risks of expropriation of their trade goods and increasing their taxes, he
was creating incentives for them to move their capital elsewhere - and Britain was always the
obvious destination. True, he stopped capital flowing fi-om Britain to Continental armies, but he
now made it flow firom Continental merchants to British funds! This was another example of
flight capital from the Continent to Britain, induced by French policy measures arising from the
French Revolution, but taking place through the instrument of the bill of exchange and book
credit of merchant bankers.
Fig. 3 shows how the mechanism of the bill of exchange could be vised to re-allocate
capital from abroad to London. In this case, the bill is initiated on the Continent as a worried
merchant or landowner pays in local currency for the purchase of a bill on London from a
Continental merchant banker. The bill is cashed in London and used to purchase a claim on a
British asset, public or private. The extinguishing of the bill results in a net increase of
indebtedness of the Continental merchant banker to the London corresptondent, which exactly
offsets in national accounting terms the increase of indebtedness of the London capital importer
to the Continental capital exporter. But this offset does not have to occur at once. It can be
carried as a book credit by the London merchant banker, in which case it does not show up in the
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national balance of payments on either capital account or current account but is subsumed into
"errors and omissions. " As long as the London merchant banker carries the book credit, the net
effect for the national income accoxmts of Britain is a capital import. ^'^ When the offset does
occur, assuming it does occtxt eventually, it does not have to take the form of a reverse claim by
London on a Continental financial asset but can occur by the import of goods from the Continent
or elsewhere. In particular, it could take the form of imports into London of colonial goods from
Dutch possessions in either the West or East Indies which previoiisly had been re-exported from
Amsterdam. Or, it covild take the form of susbsidies to military allies on the Continent hired by
the British government. Or, it could be done by the transfer of a claim on assets located
anywhere in the trading world from the Amsterdam merchant banker to the London merchant
banker.
Foreign Capital in Britain: Some Quantitative Evidence
Table 2 presents various data on the importance of foreign holdings of that part of the
British national debt administered by the Bank of England -- which was the overwhelming part
of the debt since it included all the new debt issues, especially of the Three Per Cent Consols.
These are the holdings of foreigners still resident on the Continent or in America in areas xinder
French occupation or revolutionary rule. That is, they are the holdings that were sequestered by
the Bank, which held the dividends due as well. The origins of these holdings go back to
February, 1794 when Parliament passed an act that prevented any money or effects owned by
residents of France that were currently "in the hands of His Majesty's subjects" from being given
to them.^^ The justification was that the French Revolutionary government had just passed an
act to expropriate all foreign goods belonging to French residents in order to help finance the war
against England and Austria. So if their foreign monies or effects were returned to them in the
course of normal trade, they woxild be confiscated by the Revolutionary government. The British
sequestration, by law-abiding contrast, preserved title to the monies or effects of the private
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individuals resident in France "or in any Country, territory, or place ..." under the control of the
French revolutionary government so they could eventually have the benefit of their property.
In the meantime, however, special Commissioners appointed for this task had control of
their assets. An act passed in April 1794 "for more efifectually preserving the money or
effects.. .for the benefit of the individual owners" reqviired these Commissioners to pay the assets
so acquired into an account at the Bank of England. The Commissioners were then ordered that
"all the monies to arise ... shall from time to time be laid out in the purchase of Three Pounds per
centum Consolidated Annuities, or in any other of the Public Funds transferrable at the Bank of
England." (Lambert, Vol. 92, p. 161.) The "effects" of foreigners so applied to the purchase of the
national debt for the duration of the hostilities included the payments of marine insurance claims
on ships and cargoes lost since the outbreak of hostilities by merchants under the rule of French
revolutionaries. In the first instance, the effect was relatively small; MacPherson reports that it
made dormant some £250,000 of French holdings in the British funds. (MacPherson, Vol. 4, p.
293.) The scope of this act widened as the success of the French troops continued on the
Continent and as other powers took up alliances with Napoleon. ^^
The holdings of Americans, for example, had grown considerably after the Seven Years
War, especially among wealthy Southerners. (George Washington held stock in the Bank of
England throughout the Revolutionary War.) But American holdings were not included in the
Bank's accounts until the Jefferson Embargo took effect in January 1808. At that time, their
remaining investments in English government stocks were frozen as well and added to the total.
In January 1807 the principal of the unredeemed debt administered by the Bank was calculated
at £550,441,393. So the December 1806 sequestrated holdings of foreigners were merely 2.8% of
the total debt and only a bit under 3.2% of the Three Per Cents. But the discussion above
demonstrated that the investments by foreigners in English government stocks were primarily
by those not yet subject to expropriation of their capital by the forces of the French Revolution.
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So the levels shown in Table 2 must be scaled up by some unknown factor, perhaps three or five
for the earlier years, but surely not less than two at any time.
Another set of numbers can be taken from the reports made to Parliament of the
exemptions from the income tax claimed by foreigners receiving dividends on their holdings of
British securities. The first report was made in 1803, but it was not until the latter half of 1806
that enforcement of the tax became effective and the claiming of exemptions rose. The claiming
of exemptions ceased in 1815 as the income tax lapsed. These figures are shown in Fig. 4 and
linked there to estimates given to Parliament in 1819 by the Bank to indicate the movement of
foreigners out of British securities after the war. They do not connect very well to the earlier
data on exemptions -- most, but not all of the discrepancy arises from the exclusion of holdings of
East India Company stock and holdings of South Sea stock and annuities from the Bank's 1819
report (these are also excluded from the sequestration data in Table 2). It does not appear,
moreover, from the seciuities reported in common (e.g., Three Per Cent Consols, Four Per Cents,
Reduced Three Per Cents, and so on) that the exemptions data include the sequestered data. It
would not make sense for a foreigner with sequestered holdings to employ an attorney to claim
exemptions from tax on dividends that were going to be sequestered in any event. It seems
appropriate then to add the exempt series to the sequestered totals. This doubles the minimum
share of foreigners in British national debt to over 6% on average during the heighth of
hostilities.^^
Moreover, to these numbers must be added holdings acquired by recent immigrants,
whose flight from the Revolution took them to English ports. Now resident in England, their
holdings would earn dividends without restriction and so they would not be included in the
Bank's accounting of foreign owners. Nor would they be exempt from the income tax since their
place of residence was now in the United Kingdom. The immigrants in England who had come
directly from France were few in number, (fewer than 10,000 were counted in London in 1797
and over half of these were clergy),!^ but the argument really applies more to Ehitch and German
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merchants and aristocrats than to French. MacPherson (Vol. 4, p. 334, 345, 347) reports a series
of acts in the late 1790s designed to encourage Dutch merchants, shippers, and fishermen to
migrate to Britain, with their capital and household goods and concludes with the observation for
1795:
The defection of all these powers from the alliance with Great Britain, and even
the accession of some of the chief of them to France, did not prevent the British
funds from keeping up at a price which could scarcely be expected xinder such
circumstances, the three-per-cents continuing considerably above twenty years'
purchase; and the other funds fluctuating from a Little above, or a little below,
that price. This was chiefly ascribed to the great quantity of money invested in
the British funds by people of property in Europe, who feared the consequences of
the convulsions on the continent, and tnisted to a greater stability in the affairs
of this sea-girt coiintry. (p. 354)
Another major element of British war finance that reduced the burden of debt was the
importance of unpaid dividends. Parliament received a fuU accounting from the Bank shortly
after the Revolution of the amoiuits due but not paid to owners of the government securities
transferable at the Bank (which was all debt except that owed to the East India Company and
the South Sea Company). In the year ending December 31, 1789 the Bank paid out over £8
million in quarterly dividends. But it left unpaid another £2,624,709.^^ Most of these arose from
the estates of deceased individuals who apparently died intestate, and some dated back to the
first half of the eighteenth cent\iry.20 When faced with the demands for increased expenditures
to carry on the war against France in 1793, Parliament took advantage of these accumulated
forfeitures to reduce the annual transfers made by the Treasury to the Bank in order to cover just
the dividends on all government debt that would actually be claimed by debtholders at the Bank.
This action alone amounted to a one-time write down of over 25% in the effective burden of the
government debt on the taxing facilities of the British government at the beginning of the
hostilities. Similar reductions were made in the transfers made annually to the South Sea
Company to cover payment on its Three Per Cent Annuities, Old and New. These were one time
gains, but substantial ones that account in large part for the relative ease with which Britain
managed its war financing in the 1790s.
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The East India Company represented another source of revenues independent of domestic
tax collections, one that had to be treated differently than the Bank or the South Sea Company.
It proved to be a growing source of revenues, thanks to the Government's increasing control over
the Company's revenues and thanks to the Company's increasing fiscal control over the Indian
states and over European trade with Asia. The first step, taken in 1793, was to pay the interest
owed by the Government to the East India Company into the Three Per Cent Reduced Annuities
and to claim that this redeemed the Government's debt to the Company (33 George HI, c. 47).
The second step, taken later in 1793, was to strengthen the Government's control over the
administration, accounts, and revenues of the East India Company (33 (3eorge m, c. 52) The key
features of this act were to increase the payments made by the Company to the (jovemment: 1)
to £500,000 annually into the Exchequer, 2) to another £500,000 annually for transferring the
debt owed to the Company in India by subject states and individuals to Great Britain, and 3)
after the debt in India had been reduced to £2,000,000, to paying 5/6 of the Company's siu-plus
thereafter into the Bank in the name of the Commissioners for the reduction of the national debt.
The vastly increased trade of the Company between Asia and Europe as the business of the
competing Dutch and French East India Companies was taken over by the English company
provided another growing source of cxistoms revenues to the Government as well. By 1812, the
House of Commons' Select Committee on the East India Company was able to report "that on the
average of the last 17 years £10,900,000 per annum has been diffused in various channels
through the whole circvdation of the British Empire. By this its manufactxires have been
supported, encouraged, and improved; its shipping has been increased; its revenues augmented;
its commerce extended; its agriculture promoted; and its power and resources invigorated, and
upheld." (As quoted in Colquhoun, Appendix I, p. 42.) In addition, the report recognized that
these numbers would be "still further enhanced by the remittance of fortunes known to have
been made in a variety of shapes from India to England, through extraneous and circuitous
channels, to an amount which there is no possibility of tracing with accuracy." (Colqiihoun, p.
41.)2i
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Foreign Holdings in British Securities: A Narrative
Finally, we ni\ist retxim to the point made by Herries above that bills of exchange drawn
on London and held by foreign merchants who could not obtain British goods with them, due to
whatever reason, represented so much investment in British industry. This view of the transfer
process allows \is to re-interpret the shocks to London exchange rates in terms of their effects on
foreign investment in British industry. Herries' argument was that if Britain initiated its
transfer of real resources to its Continental allies by selling bills of exchange to them, so long as
they deferred realizing these bills by purchasing imports from Britain with them, they had
invested in Britain. So, by this argument, the initial financial transfer of bills on London by the
British government to Continental quartermasters in 1793, instead of increasing British exports
of consumer goods to the Continent, led to foreign merchants building up their credits with
London merchant bankers. When the pound was made inconvertible in 1797, foreign balances
held in Britain were locked in, for if they were withdrawn through foreign bills of exchange they
would lose value by the resulting fall in the London exchange rate. The British Orders in
Council blockaded the French ports and the Continental ports occupied by the French. The
French, for their part, confiscated any foreign goods found at their ports. The two warring
powers combined forces to keep foreign merchants from repatriating their British investments by
imports to the Continent.
The foreign merchants most affected were precisely those located in the prosperous
regions north and east of Revolutionary France -- the United Provinces of the Netherlands, the
Austrian Netherlands, the conglomeration of political units that made up the Rhineland, Hessia,
S\yitzerland, Hanover and so on. As the French troops moved successively into these regions,
they brought not only liberty, equality, and fraternity but also higher taxes, conscription, loss or
uncertainty of existing property rights, and secularization. The economic effect was devastating
in the short run and did not ameliorate much when the initial revolutionary governments were
replaced by more conservative authorities concerned to maintain the new set of property rights.
The reason was the increasing pressure of Napoleon's military enterprise upon the Icuids outside
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France proper. These territories constantly saw their taxes increased and remitted to France and
their real transfer burden magnified by the high tariffs France imposed even against her satellite
kingdoms.22 The benefits of the Continental System to some of the French maniofactviring
sectors were not shared by the rest of the Continent under French suzerainty. Moreover, they
suffered, as did France, fi'om the disruption by the British blockade of the Atlantic and Asian
trade that had brought great prosperity to the port cities of northwestern Europe in the
eighteenth century.^3
After the Treaty of Amiens in 1802, British exports rose to the Continent and the paper
pound strengthened (Fig. 5). This implies a real transfer to the Continent through a British
export surplus on the trade account -- and this implies a repatriation of foreign capital that had
been locked in since 1797. The fi-esh outbreak of war in 1803 hampered the flow of repatriated
funds and the Continental Blockade in 1805 put an end to it. Despite the reigning orthodoxy of
Heckscher (1922) and Crouzet (1958) that the Blockade hurt France in the long run more than
Britain, there is mounting evidence that this interpretation has been overdrawn. Crouzet
himself noted that the short-run effects were severe on British trade. Jeffrey Frankel has shown
that the American Embargo of 1808 which was complementary to (and perhaps coordinated with)
the Continental Blockade affected the British terms of trade much more adversely than it did the
American terms of trade. (Frankel, 1982) Mokyr and Savin emphasize the disruption of British
trade patterns and its adverse efiect on exports. (Mokyr and Savin, 1976) Geoffrey Ellis
documents that down river traffic on the Upper Rhine rose dramatically during the Blockade
period while up river traffic fell, which is consistent with a rise in the Upper Rhine's gross barter
terms of trade. (EUis, pp. 276-7.) In sum, the Blockade was effective in limiting British trade
with the Continent, but not effective in limiting Britain finance of the war against the
Continent. The ineffectiveness, however, was not due to the inability of Napoleon's measures to
restrict trade flows, but rather due to the substitution of capital flows for the previous trade
flows.
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The evidence of asset price movements in the capital markets (Fig. 6) indicates there is a
prima facie case that rather than British government war expenditxires "crowding out" private
domestic investment, the dominant effect at times was that revolutionary measures by the
French government "crowded in" flight capital to Britain. Especially marked is the rise in the
Three Per Cent Consols after the French Revolution took a turn to radicalism in 1791 and before
the outbreak of war in 1793. The failure of the subsidized troops of the Continental allies to stop
the advances of the French Revolutionary armies led to continued falls in all three stocks. This
was dramatically interrupted in December 1794, but that is merely evidence that the wealthy
Dutch and foreign merchants Liquidating their stores in Amsterdam were investing in the
English funds as a first haven for their flight capital.
After February 1797 and the advent of the paper pound, ("paper pound" refers to the
restriction of convertibility of Bank of England notes into gold bullion or coin during the period
1797-1821), there is no more evidence of prolonged decline in any of the three stocks shown.
Rather, the picture is of gradual improvement in each, with severe setbacks on two occasions: 1)
the resumption of hostilities with France in 1803 and 2) the crisis caused by the Continental
Blockade imposed in 1807 and completed with the Jefferson Embargo in 1808. This picture
conforms weU with that already noted by Norman SUberling (1919) in his classic article on
British war finance in this period. SilberHng noted that the yield on Consols rose fi-om slightly
under 4 per cent in 1793 to nearly 6 per cent when the Bank sxispended convertibility.
Thereafter the yield was always lower, falling rapidly to 1802 and then fluctuating between 4Mi
per cent and 5V4 per cent to the end of the war. Interest rates on Exchequer bills and yields on
stock of a London dock company followed much the same course.
The stability of the price of Consols and the rise in price of Bank and East India
Company stock over the course of the Napoleonic Wars indicate the possible importance of
foreign capital in the British financial markets. After the war, of course, there was good reason
for both foreign capital and British speculative capital to return to the Continent. But the return
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flow of capital would be much less than the original outflow, mainly because as capital left to
invest in underpriced assets on the Continent (or to re-acquire emigre property) the pound, still
inconvertible, would depreciate. D.C.M. Piatt finds as well that most of the French debt issued
after the war to pay reparations and restore the monarchy was taken up in France, even though
the Barings took the lead in underwriting it on the London market. (Piatt, ch. 1.) By the time
the pound was restored to full convertibility in 1821, the net inflow of foreign capital over the
previous quarter century of revolution and war had left Britain supreme in terms of
industrialization, international trade, and capital concentration until the end of the nineteenth
centiiry.
The British Industrial Revolution
The changes in the pattern of international capital movements that occurred under the
impact of wars and revolutions two hundred years ago have a larger significance, however, than
simply setting the stage for the nineteenth century drama of financial imperialism. For it is
precisely this period of economic development that must be xinderstood in order to unravel the
mystery of the Industrial Revolution in Great Britain. According to various traditions, this
either occurred much earlier and was brought to fioiition by the war effort, (Ashton, Landes) or
occurred immediately after the American Revolution and continued during the Napoleonic Wars,
(Rostow, Thomas) or occurred immediately after 1815. (Crafts) According to Williamson (1985),
however, it occxured after 1830 £uid was delayed by the wars of 1793-1815. Williamson argues
the military expenditures reqviired by the government crowded out private investment and
slowed down the investment process, esjjecially in social infrastructure. I will argue on the
contrary that it occtured precisely dxiring and because of the Napoleonic Wars. My argument
depends, of course, upon assigning a much larger role to the international capital markets of the
time than has been done before. 2"*
The reallocation of manufacturing effort within the British economy was surely aided, if
perhaps only indirectly, by the infusion of foreign capital. The structural change in British
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manufactTirtng that resulted was necessary to accomplish the eventual military victory on the
Continent. Now British (mostly Scottish, Irish, and Welsh) troops, not Hessians, had to be
recruited, equipped, sent abroad, and re-supplied from home. The financial side of this new
British military policy began in 1808 with massive direct payments to Wellington's troops in the
Peninsular Campaign. Foreign capital in Britain, locked in because of the Continental Blockade,
coiild be directed to investment in iron works, canals, port improvements, toU roads and the like.
Or, more likely, it could be u^ed indirectly to make these more profitable for British investors by
being invested in the government's new issues of Three Per Cent Consols. In fact, Herries
continued his testimony in 1810 by pointing out the large increase in the number of bills
approved by Parliament for creation of toll roads, canals, docks, waterworks and the like that
had arisen since the suspension of convertibility (see Table 3). Rather than British government
spending crowding out private investment, it was re-directing it.
O'Brien (1989), in sharp contrast to Williamson, argues that military expenditures did
not crowd out investment, but rather crowded out consumption and leisure. He notes the
existence of flight capital from the Continent, but focuses on the government's loose monetary
policy combined with tight fiscal policy. A much higher proportion of the mili tary outlays was
financed by taxes ("nearly 60% of the extra funds raised by the Government to prosecute war
against France from 1793-1815 came from taxes. In previous conflicts . . . that proportion comes
to only 12 percent. " (p. 348)) The taxes were universal, levied on mass consumption commodities
like beer, tea, salt, coal, and sugar as well as on luxury items like spirits, wines, windows, horses
while the income tax tried to encompass all forms of property, including not only land but also
urban rentals, mercantile capital, and seciu-ities. But they were, all told, regressive in their
impact and affected consumption more than investment. Their drag on investment was ofiset by
low interest rates maintained by loose monetary policy - the floating pound removed the foreign
exchange constraint on the Bank of England's reserves and the expansion of its note issue
provided the basis for rapid expansion of country banking. O'Brien's appraisal of the
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redistribution eflfects of tight fiscal policy combined with loose monetary policy is certainly
consistent with the relative rise in price of capital formation compared to consumption goods
revealed by Feinstein and Pollard (discussed below). However, it undermines my argument
about the impKjrtance of foreign capital imports to the extent it reduces the pull effect of
relatively high interest rates in Britain upon foreign capital. But my argument is not predicated
on pull effects, but rather wpon push eflfects -- the lower rates of return on capital on the
Continent, especially when adjusted for risks of expropriation and for taxes, which were much
higher on property after Revolutionary reforms.
Foreign Investment in British Industry: Some Quantitative Evidence
The cvirrent weight of evidence is that the rate of growth of the British economy was
respectable but slow by the standards of modem economic growth until 1820 or 1830. N. F. R.
Crafts' summary of the evidence is given in Table 4. (Crafts (1987), p. 246; 248.) This shows that
real output per head grew at respectable, but clearly low, pre-industrial, rates in the first half of
the eighteenth centmy, stagnated during the 1760-1780 period, recovered to pre-industrial rates
1780-1801 and then accelerated noticeably in the period 1801-1831. The rates of 1% annually
that are associated with modem economic growth, however, did not appear until after 1830.
Crafts regards this as a natiural maturation process given the low weight of cotton textiles in the
manufacturing sector until after 1830 and the absence of productivity growth in the rest of the
manufacturing sector. Moreover, he finds continued increases in labor productivity in the
agricultural sector which released labor to the more productive leading sectors in manufacturing.
There are problems with Crafts' explanation and it has been attacked by Jeffrey Williamson
(1987) and Joel Mokyr (1987) on different grounds. The difficulty worth mentioning here is that
Crafts does not explain how resources shifted from traditional manufacturing into the new
leading sectors that were emerging in heavy industry. Investment in heavy industry clearly
gets a major boost fix»m wartime demands and its existence after the war provided the basis for
ever cheaper capital goods. These, in turn, enabled the spread of modem manufacturing
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techniques throughout the British manufacturing sector, and to an increasing extent in the
American and Continental manufacturing sectors as well. How did that happen in Crafts'
portrayal of the transformation process?
Panel B in Table 4 shows the course of the savings and investment ratios during this
critical period as caloilated by Crafts. Savings includes all real domestic capital formation, net
foreign investment, and change in government indebtedness. Investment is just domestic capital
formation. On these calculations the investment behavior shows a steady rise throughout this
period, while the savings ratio fluctuates wildly. Most of the fluctuation is in government debt
but some is caused by variations in the ratio of net foreign investment by British lenders. Crafts
does not consider the possibility of variations in foreign absorption of British government
indebtedness as an explanation for the erratic course of the savings rate, preferring to relate it to
the equally erratic course of inflation. But once we recognize the importance of foreign savings
in absorbing the British government indebtedness, then the shocks to foreign investors from the
misfortunes of revolution and war make plausible fluctuations in their contribution to British
savings on this scale.
The problem with this suggestion is that the net foreign investment figures we cturently
use make it appear that Britain had net foreign disinvestment only in the period 1801-10, and
the preceding decade of revolution and war caused only a slowing down of British net investment
abroad, which resumed on a large scale in the decades 1811-20 and 1821-30. (Table 4, Panel B.
Cf. Feinstein & Pollard, p. 466) These are unreliable figures, to say the least, since they are
calculated on very rough estimates of the current trade balance and the equally rough
assximption that the current trade balance is offset by net capital flows. Other items that might
offset the trade balance are loss of reserves, unrecorded specie flows, services, short-term capital
flows in the form of trade credits, and, of course, "errors and omissions"! But since these
estimates of net capital formation have been made it is useful to refer back to another set of
figures in Table 1. These are Ralph Davis' careful calculations of trade flows in current prices at
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benchmark intervals within this period. The last column in the table presents the implied
balance of trade for Great Britain, something Davis refused to do. Davis' estimates indicate
persistent balance of trade deficits for Britain in this period although they fall relative to
growing national income. ^^
The deficits could be covered by surpluses on invisibles (primarily earnings on shipping,
insurance, and brokerage) or by capital imports. Crouzet, O'Brien and Davis have all
emphasized the increased importance of shipping earnings for the British merchant marine
during this period. Davis, for example, notes that "though the employment of foreign ships
increased in wartime, it was (except in the single year 1810) only a small fi-action of all shipping
entering British ports." (Davis, p. 56, fn. 9) But to the extent foreign shipping did increase its
share in British trade, the importance of capital imports must rise relative to invisible earnings
as an offset to the trade deficit. Moreover, both ships and cargoes were typically held in shares of
less than l/24th for each owner by this period and the owners could vary widely in nationality,
especially for a ship flying under the British flag. So the incidence of the nationality of the ships
overstates the incidence of the nationality of the shipping earnings. Finally, Davis' method of
calculation of wartime prize goods and losses systematically understates the import deficit.
Exports leaving Great Britain are all counted in his statistics, whether they reached their
destination or were captured by enemy ships. Prize goods brought in by the Royal Navy and
British privateers were included in the trade records of the time as both imports and re-exports,
but Davis decided to exclude them from the import figures while including them under re-exports
"as ordinary sales." (Davis, p. 81) So the spoils of war for Britain are included in the export side
but its losses of war are excluded fi-om the import side in his calculations.
Table 5 tries to put all these figures in some kind of comparative perspective. The
average annual sums of military expenditure over the period as calculated by O'Brien are
compared to the proportion financed by taxes, new debt, and import deficits. Parliament's
average figure of £10,900,000 "diffusion" from the triumphs of British merchants and military in
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India are very large by comparison with these or, for good measvire, the estimates of Feinstein
and Pollard of gross domestic fixed capital formation over the period. This suggests that the
explanation for the remarkably robust performance of the British economy under wartime
pressures derived not so much fi-om the benefits of increased liquidity (Colquhoun), increased
work effort (McCulloch), increased capacity utilization (Anderson), or the combined effects of a
tight fiscal and loose monetary policy (O'Brien), as fi-om the availability of increased foreign
resources.
An Investment Boom in British during Wartime: The Quantitative Evidence
Wartime demands were mentioned above as a possible explanation for the structural
transformation of British industry that Crafts does not explain. Williamson, however, argues
that these government requirements crowded out private investment and therefore slowed down
the overall investment process. (Williamson (1984, 1985, 1987, 1990)) The impact of crowding
out may have been less than he calculated originally, a point he concedes to Joel Mokyr's
recalculations, and it may not have afiected the real interest rate on government securities, a
point he initially conceded to Heim and Mirowski, but then rescinded on the basis of work by
Black and Giimore (1990). But he maintains, nevertheless, that crowding out of private
investment by rising government debt was still substantial. If nothing else, it may have driven
up the risk premiiim attached to non-governmental debt so real interest rates for private
investment still increased and slowed down economic growth.
On this point, there is some qualitative evidence to suggest that, rather than raising the
risk premia attached to private investments, the periodic surges of foreign capital into British
financial markets stimulated the increase of joint-stock corporations in the private sector. The
first major rise in corporations after the Bubble Act of 1720 had limited them to specific
Parliamentary charters occiured during the canal craze of the early 1790s. (Hunt, p. 10.) The
next surge of incorporation occurred during the speciilative boom of 1807, which followed the
implementation of the Continental Blockade, and which tied up stocks of goods Imported fi-om
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Spanish, Dutch, and French colonies into Britain intended for re-export to the Continent. Why
would foreign capital stimxilate the promotion of joint-stock corporations? The answer lies in the
advantages to relatively ill-infonned investors of the transferable share in a joint-stock
corporation that is traded in an active, transparent, secondary market over partnership shares in
joint partnerships. Moreover, with sequestration or income tax lying in wait for the foreign
investor in British government debt or the East India Company stock or South Sea Company
securities, private corporation stocks became much more attractive.
But far more damaging evidence against the crowding out thesis is found in the new
estimates of capital formation produced by Feinstein and Pollard (1988). Williamson (1990) does
make some use of these, but only to reinforce his main concern, the relatively slow growth of
social overhead capital in Britain during its industrial surge compared to follower countries. But
he neglects to mention that Feinstein and PoUard's estimates show that capital formation
accelerated in the period 1791-1800 and again in 1801-1810. More importantly, their impUcit
price deflators for capital formation show clearly that in those decades the price of capital goods
rose more sharply than the price of consumer goods (Table 6). This is in sharp contrast to the
preceding decades and the following decade when consumer prices rose more rapidly than capital
goods prices. It is also in sharp contrast to the relative price movements we would expect if war
expenditures were crowding out investment expenditures. In that case, demand for capital goods
would be relatively suppressed and so would their prices. But just the opposite occurred - prices
of capital goods surged and most markedly for agriculture, dwellings and public service. In other
words, the best estimates to date of investment behavior in Britain during the French
Revolutionary and Napoleonic Wars indicate that private investment rose during wartime, and
most considerably in precisely the social infrastructure.
So the disruptions to British export markets created by Napoleon and Jefferson also
created unusually large capital imports which increased the supply of loanable funds to the
British economy. These same disruptions, however, also increased the demand for investments
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in agricultural improvements, internal transportation networks, and in capital goods for meeting
increased military demands. The contemporary observer, Francois d'lvemois, noted in 1810:
Never have agricultural improvements advanced with such rapid strides, as
within the last two years. This has naturally arisen; first, from the increased
price of domestic produce, in consequence of that of the Continent being withheld;
and secondly, from the employment in agriculture of much of that accumvdating
capital which otherwise might probably have been employed in the extension of
the commerce by which it was produced.
(GRS, V. I, p. 95, fii. a.)
The significance of the shift in wartime government demand, away from the export-
oriented textiles and toward the military and naval-driven iron trades, was that it re-directed
domestic capital formation in favor of heavy industry and infrastructure. The presence of
additional foreign capital as a result of the Continental Blockade meant these increased
expenditures did not have to come at the expense of either residential construction or
agricultural improvements. This explains the otherwise puzzling sequence of investment in
textiles, iron, agriculture, and roads and waterways found by Feinstein and Pollard. ^^ Fig. 7
shows clearly the acceleration in investment in ironworks and in roads and waterways that took
place at the outset of the war and again with the imposition of the Continental Blockade. More
remarkably, while the rate of investment in cotton factories and agricultural improvements did
not continue to rise as rapidly as before, neither did it drop.
Fig. 8 shows the course of various production indicators - cotton yam, pig iron, and
bricks - which corroborate the change in the structure of demand that drove the investment
patterns shown in Fig. 7. While the Continental Blockade restricted the production of cotton
yam, the Peninsular Army promoted the output of pig iron. Meanwhile, the production of bricks
- a key indicator of overall construction activity - continued to rise. The significance of this was
noted by Shannon who remarked on the "unusually high stable level" of his index in the later
years of the Napoleonic Wars. But he found confirmation of his findings in the earlier work of
Dorothy George who remarked, "The latter part of the great war reversed the tradition as to
building in war-time Euid was a period of great building activity." (quoted by Shannon, p. 189)
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From the earliest quantitative work on the performance of the British economy in this period to
the most recent, then, we find little empirical support for the crowding out thesis, despite the
high moral ground it commands and the apparently compelling logic it possesses.
Conclusion
Williamson points out, however, that the more other scholars discredit the crowding out
thesis, the more burden they take on for themselves to explain why British growth was so slow
during the period 1760-1820. (Williamson (1984), pp. 287-290.) That is precisely a challenge we
can accept using oiu- understanding of the extent, depth, and resilience of the international
capital markets of the time. The crowding out thesis of Ashton-Mill-Williamson is certainly
weakened and possibly overtiimed by the extent of foreign investment in British pubUc debt,
commercial ventures, agricultiiral mortgages and equity in the spate of new corporations formed
dtiring the wars. The slow growth of the economy to 1820 is explained by the effectiveness of the
trade restrictions imposed by Napoleon's Continental System and Jefferson's Embargo fi-om
1808-1814, and the return of capital to the Continent from 1815-19.
While war made unusually large and sxistained demands upon the British economy in
this period, revolution on the Continent and British naval superiority everywhere redefined
property rights, especially of merchants engaged in foreign trade, so that unusually large and
sustained resources were supplied to the British economy as well. The prior existence of weU-
organized secvirities and foreign exchange markets in London, with reliable enforcement of
property rights for native and foreigner alike, enabled British entrepreneurs to match up quickly
the new challenges with the new opportunities. A critical role in producing the asymmetrical
effects of the start of war and the end of war on capital flows between Britain and the Continent
was played by the financial policy innovation of the "paper pound" in 1797. This innovation was
initially merely a technical response to the fundamental changes in property rights being
wrought on the Continent by the French Revolution. Its persistence well past the postwar shocks
of reparations and reconstruction until 1821, however, gave it a significance that is worth
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pondering anew in our current era of flexible exchange rates and pressvtres for stabilizing them.
Moreover, the quarter century of a floating pound sterling from 1797-1821 helps us provide a
logical economic and financial Unk between the French Revolution and the British Industrial
Revolution.
* Many versions of this paper have been given, including seminars at Colby
College, University of British Columbia, University of California at Los Angeles,
University of Chicago, University of Illinois, University of South Carolina, and
Washington University at St. Louis, as well as at the ESRC meetings at the
University of Hull in 1989. In addition to the referees, a nvunber of helpful
comments were received especially from Jeremy Atack, Elise Brezis, Francois
Crouzet, Lance Davis, Peter Lindert, Joel Mokyr, and Jeffrey Williamson. I remain
intransigent in my original views, nevertheless, although successive re-writings
have, I hope, cleared up misunderstandings.
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1 Fetter mentions the pamphlets of John Hill, An Inquiry into the Causes of the Present High
Price of Gold Bullion in England, (London, 1810), and John R. Herries, Review of the Controversy
reflecting the High Price ofBullion and the State ofour Currency, QLondon; J. Budd, 1811).
2 The only modem economist I have fovuid, however, to place the same emphasis I do on
international capital movements in this period is Frank W. Fetter (1965), pp. 45-6. Among
contemporary observers, David MacPherson (1804) in his Annals refers repeatedly to imports of
foreign flight capital as weU as to seizures of Ehitch colonies, especially the Dutch East India
Company's possessions. But Patrick Colqiihoun (1815) downplays the role of foreign capital in
the enormous expansion of savings that occurred in Britain during the Napoleonic Wars (p. 279
and p. 298).
3 Great Britain, British Parliamentary Papers, (1797), "Third Report, 21 April 1797 of
Committee of Secrecy on the Outstanding Demands of the Bank of England," (London; 1797).
* Great Britain, British Parliamentary Papers, (1819), "Reports from the Secret Committee on
the Expediency of The Bank resuming Cash Payments," London: House of Commons, 5 April and
6 May, 1819. Appendix A.12., "Letter and Explanatory Paper of Mr. Harman, p. 318.
5 Postlethwayt, s.v. "Acceptances", "Accepter", "Bills of Exchange", and "Drawer".
^ These interrelationships are analyzed in much greater detail in my Rise of Financial
Capitalism, (Cambridge University Press, 1990), especially chs. 1 and 6.
'^ Adam Smith (1776), describes this system at the outset of Book IV, "Principle of the
Mercantile System" (pp. 410-414 in the Modem Library edition of 1937). Professor Crouzet notes
that British military payments on the Continent coxild also be done by British agents on the
Continent drawing bills on the Treasury, which were bought by local merchants, who then used
them to pay for imports from Britain. Once in place, the close financial connections between
Amsterdam and London, established during the reign of William and Mary, allowed many
variants of the payment process.
8 Foot soldiers were rented in 1793 from Hesse-Cassel at £7 14s. each and cavalrymen at £19
5s. each. (Sherwig, p. 18.)
9 Cunningham gives an extended argument that this was done consciously by Napoleon on the
basis of the analysis provided by J. H. Mamiere, the Chevalier de Guer, whose pamphlet, Etat de
la situation des finance de I'Angleterre et de la banque de Londres aujuin 1802 is reprinted at the
end of her work, Audrey Cunningham, British Credit in the Last Napoleonic War, (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 1910).
1° Sherwig records the low point of subsidies at only £83,303 to Hesse-Cassel in 1804 and
thereafter subsidies are paid in an ever wider arc including eventually Sweden, Sicily, and Spain,
(pp. 366-7. Note the inconsistency with his graph on p. 369 which shows lows in 1804 and 1806.)
^^ See S. Cock, An Examination of the Report of the Bullion Committee, London, 1810. Cock, a
Liverpool agent, argued that so far from driving up the price of gold, the Bank's increased issue
of notes helped keep down its price, because the notes substituted for gold as a means of payment
in domestic trade.
^2 I assiune he meant British economic activity generally, rather than manufacturing only,
when he used the term "industry."
^^ Great Britain, Reports from the Secret Committee on the Expediency of The Bank resuming
Cash Payments, London: House of Commons, 5 April and 6 May, 1819, p. 263, "Minutes of the
Court of Directors of the Bank of England, 25th March 1819. "
^* Crouzet (1989) presents a nice example of this phenomenon in the accounts of the American
merchants, John and Richard Codman, with Francis and John Baring. They opened their
accoimt by depositing one hundred shares of the Bank of the United States with Baring and Co.
in Jvine 1793 "as a collateral security for advances that we are about making for your account."
In fact, Barings sold the shares on 23 July and credited the account of John and Richard Codman
with a net amount of £10,831. (p. 101) By 1 September 1794, however, the Codman account with
Baring and Co., showed net liabilities of £11,610, mainly because the younger brother, Richard,
was systematically investing proceeds of cargoes sold in France back into French real estate,
paintings, books, French funds, and biens nationaux. (pp. 126-131) The books and paintings were
exportable, the rest were not. And Richard was declared bankrupt in France in 1802.
This episode, while counter to the main theme of my paper because it shows French imports
being balanced by capital imports to France rather than British imports financed by capital
imports, does illustrate the importance of book credit in the hands of merchant bankers such as
the firm of John and Francis Baring & Co., both in terms of the amounts involved and in terms of
the lengthy time periods over which net assets or liabilities could be carried. In this case. Baring
& Co. were inadvertently financing capital exports fi'om the U.S. to France, so they were
exporting capital fi-om Britain to France fi-om 1794 to 1800, while Richard was pursuing his folie.
From 1800 to 1803, however, they were importing capital to Britain from the U.S. because in this
period Richard's brother John ran large credits in his separate account with Baring and Co.,
apparently paying off finally the debts Richard had accumulated, (p. 130) He probably was doing
this by means of American securities, because he had given up trading operations by the end of
1800. (p. 135)
^^ 34 Geo. En, c. 9. The Act is reprinted in Sheila Lambert, ed.. House of Commons Sessional
Papers of the Eighteenth Century, (WUmington, DE: Scholarly Resources, 1975), Vol. 92, "Bills,
1794", pp. 1-16 and discussed in MacPherson, Vol. 4, pp. 292-3.)
^^ Professor Crouzet informs me this Act was not strictly enforced, as this would have stopped
all trade with enemy countries - against the wishes of the British government. But if it was not,
then my figures presented in Table 2 are certainly an iinderstatement of foreign holdings of
British assets and so must be multiplied by some factor greater than one, as I argue below.
1'^ Williamson (1990) has argued that this merely reflects existing holdings of foreigners in the
British debt before hostilities began. However, the sequestered funds of foreigners and claims for
tax exemptions by foreigners, the new data presented here, only begin after the major incentives
for movements of Dutch and Rhenish funds back into British national debt had taken place, so
they cannot pick up the original rise in foreign investments. They do show clearly, however, the
repatriation of these funds after the war, which is my major point about the relatively depressed
British economy from 1815 to 1820. Williamson errs in thinking that the Dutch were already
large holders of English national debt at the beginning of the wars. As James Riley (1980), not
referenced by Williamson, pointed out some years ago, the Dutch moved out of most of their
holdings of English debt during the American War for Independence, which ended with the
Fourth Anglo-Dutch War in 1894 and which created very real fears of sequestration of their
holdings by the English government of the time. The original work on Dutch repatriation of
their investments during the American War for Independence and the decade following was by
Alice Carter (1953).
18 Lambert, ed.. Vol. 104, "Reports and Papers, 1796-97", p. 339.
19 Lambert, ed.. Vol. 81, "Reports and Papers, 1790-91", pp. 1-3.
20 The bulk of Vol. 81 is devoted to a Listing of the names and addresses of each "proprietor" in
the funds transferred at the Bank and the South Sea House whose dividend had not paid at the
last dividend date, when the first dividend was missed, and how many times the dividend had
been missed. The number of accounts at the Bank is 7,479 (p. 201). The total of unpaid
dividends that year is £77,527 and at the South Sea House another £70,249 (p. 179).
21 Ralph Davis (1979, p. 55) remarks that the disinvestment of the Dutch from British funds
after 1783 combined with a British deficit, or only a small sxirplus, on current account, creates a
mystery that will probably be resolved only when economic historians turn their attention to
"the plunder of India in the decades after Plassey, a new and enormoiis element thrown in the
scales of Britain's overseas balance." My argument is that the plionder became systematic and
increasingly to the benefit of the government, especially after the Commutation Act of 1784 and
the appointment of Comwallis as Governor-General of India in 1786.
22 See T. C. W. Blanning, The French Revolution in Germany: Occupation and Resistance in the
Rhineland, 1792-1802, (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1983) for an enlightening contrast of a
prosperous, lightly taxed Ancien regime in the Rhineland with a depopulated, heavily taxed and
rebellious area actually incorporated within the French tariff wall, which cut it off from its
natural markets on the right bank of the Rhine.
23 Points made by Francois Crou^et, (1964). Crou2«t did not inquire, however, how merchants
and manufacturers in the rest of Europe might have protected themselves, other than migrate to
France.
2'* Although there is an implicit appreciation of the role they must have played in the Little
known treatment by Fritz Machlup, "The Transfer Problem: Theme and Four Variations," in F.
Machlup, International Payments, Debts, and Gold, 2nd ed., (New York: New York University
Press, 1975), pp. 374-395. And O'Brien (1989, pp. 350-1) notes the importance of the improved
financial markets and increase in country banks as well as the loose monetary policy of the Bank
of England for keeping down the real rate of interest throughout the war period.
25 The odd thing is the sharp rise in the trade deficit in 1824-26, which may not be so odd if we
recall the stock market boom of 1824-25 which was led by speculation on Latin American mining
stocks fueled by capital imports from the Spanish ex-colonialists. The persistent trade deficits
found by Davis indicate the possibiUty of persistent net capital imports, and the surge in the
trade deficit in 1824-26 indicates a surge in capital imports, consistent with the observations of
contemporaries.
26 More precisely, the estimates of capital formation in agricultvire are by B. A. Holdemess, ch.
1; those for the iron industry by R. S. W. Davies and Sidney Pollard, ch. 3; for cotton indvistry by
Stanley Chapman and John Butt, ch. 4; and roads and waterways by John GinarUs and Sidney
Pollard, ch. 8 -- all in Feinstein and Pollard (1988).
TABLE 1.
Trade balances during war and revolution
(annual averages in millions of pounds)
Date Exports
(constant)
Re-exports
(constant)
Imports
(ciirrent)
Exports
(cttrrent)
Reexports
(current)
Balance
of trade
1784-86 11.4 4.5 20.4 12.7 2.7 -5.0
1794-96 17.5 11.8 34.3 21.8 6.9 -5.6
1804-06 25.4 11.4 50.6 37.5 8.3 -4.8
1814-16 39.0 17.3 64.7 44.5 16.1 -4.1
1824-26 48.5 11.4 57.0 35.3 8.1 -13.6
Source: Ralph Davis, The Industrial Revolution and British Overseas Trade (Leicester, UK:
Leicester University Press, 1979), p. 86. Davis did not give the calculated balance of
,
trade (exports + reexports - imports) stating "The differences of 5 per cent or more that
appear in carefully calculated aggregates of import and export totals made by different
scholars are so large that the possible error swamps the balancing figure that is aimed
at" (p. 85). Caveat lector!
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TABLE 3.
BILLS OF ENCLOSURE, NAVIGATION AND CANAL BILLS,
AND TURNPIKE ROADS, 1788-1818.
End's
Years No.
Navig'n & Canal
No. Slims Auth'd No.
Docks Turnpike Roads
Sums Auth'd No.
1788 35 3 115,000
1789 33 3 133,500
1790 25 8 377,400
1791 40 10 803,700
1792 40 9 1,063,600
1793 60 26 3,159,700
1794 74 18 2,588,500
1795 77 11 384,732
1796 72 14 1,306,000
1797 85 8 156,600
1798 48 5 191,929
1799 63 1 35,000
1800 80 10 539,400
1801 122 11 932,100
1802 96 8 277,000
1803 104 6 620,000
1804 52 6 271,680
1805 71 9 470,000
1806 76 9 600,550
1807 91 8 167,000
1808 92 7 332,200
1809 122 13 611,000
1810 107 7 368,000
1811 133 14 2,015,400
1812 119 9 1,533,000
1813 111 5 282,500
1814 112 6 129,000
1815 75 7 347,000
1816 43 2 210,000
1817 30 6 479,300
1818 38 5 153,000
30,000
1
3
4
4
6
1 15,000 2
2
3
1 4
2
1 120,000 2
1 1,500,000 3
4
2 310,000 4
2 302,000 6
1 500,000 2
2 50,000 7
2 200,000 2
1 4
4
2 100,000 13
2 880,000 12
1 60,000 ' 9
1 8
2
2 100,000 8
1 300,000 10
6
1 76,250 6
1 7
Source:
GREAT BRITAIN, British Parliamentary Papers, (1819), "Reports from the Secret Committee
on the Expediency of The Bank resuming Cash Payments," London; House of Commons, 5
April and 6 May, 1819. AppendLx G.2, pp. 425-6.
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TABLE 4.
British economic growth during war and revolution
A. Real output (% per year)
Date Real output Real output Real commodity Real private
per head output sector output
1700-1760 0.69 0.31 0.64 0.60
1760-1780 0.70 0.01 0.61 0.66
1780-1801 1.32 0.35 1.35 1.26
1801-1831 1.97 0.52 2.18 2.07
B. Savings and investment
Date
1761-1770
1771-1780
1781-1790
1791-1800
1801-1810
1811-1820
1821-1830
Sgp^ Igpdcf^ If/Y
10.0 5.9 0.64
11.6 6.4 0.51
15.3 7.7 1.34
20.5 8.3 0.88
13.5 8.0 -1.12
19.7 9.7 2.55
12.1 11.0 2.66
Notes : S^n = gross private saving; Igpdcf = gross private domestic capital formation;
If = private foreign investment by Great Britain.
Source: N. F. R. Crafts, "British Economic Growth, 1700-1850; Some DtSiculties of Interpretation,"
Explorations in Economic History, 24 (July 1987), pp. 246, 248.
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TABLE 5.
Military Expenditures of Great Britain during the French Revolutionary and Napoleonic Wars
Compared with Net Borrowings, Deficits, India "diffusion" and GDFCF.
War Spending Net Import Deficits India Gross Domestic Fixed
(annual averages) Borrowing (annual avgs.) "diflfusion" Capital Formation
Years (£mill.) (annual averages) Years (£mill.) (£mill.) (£niill.) Years
10.9 11.26 1791-001793-97 16.62 20.0 1794-6 -5.6
1798-02 24.6 20.0
1803-07 32.5 13.5 1804-06 -4.8
1808-12 47.7 13.5
1813-17 55.1 23.0 1814-16 -4.1
10.9 20.13 1801-10
10.9 25.13 1811-20
Source: Cols. 1-3: Patrick Karl O'Brien (1989) "The Impact of the Revolutionary and Napoleonic Wars,
1793-1815, on the Long-Run Growth of the British Economy," Review CFemand Braudel Center)
12 (Summer), p. 341, p. 346.
Cols. 4-5: Ralph Davis (1979), The Industrial Revolution and British Overseas Trade, (Leicester
University Press), p. 86 (calculated).
Col. 6: Patrick Colquhoun, Treatise on the Wealth, Power and Resources of the British Empire in
Every Quarter of the World, London: Joseph Mawman, 1815, Appendix I, p. 42.
Cols. 7-8: Charles H. Feinstein and Sidney PoUard (1988), Studies in Capital Formation in the
United Kingdom, 1750-1920, Oxford: Clarendon, p. 429.
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Figure 1.
The Normal Bill of Exchange
LONDON AMSTERDAM
Drawee
(Remitter, Importer)
Goods
Payee
(Possessor, Exporter)
Debt
Drawer
(Merchant Banker)
Payer, Accepter
(Merchant Banker)
Legend: Goods
Money
Debt
Bills
Figure 2.
The Bill of Exchange in War Finance
LONDON AMSTERDAM
Drawee
(Government — Exchequer)
Payee
(British Quartermaster)
Claims
Drawer
(Bank of England)
Exports (victory)
or
Specie (defeat)
Military
Dutch
specie
o
Q
'o
a.
01
Payer, Accepter
(Merchant Banker)
Legend: Claims
Money
Goods
Bills
Figure 3.
The Bill of Exchange in Capital Movements
LONDON AMSTERDAM
Payee
(Possessor, Capitol Importer)
Drawee
(Remitter, Capital Exporter)
Claim on asset
Payer, Accepter
(Merchant Banker)
4
Debt
Drawer
(Merchant Banker)
Legend: Claims
Money
Debt
Bills
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